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Motivation 
 
Affective computing and emotional interfaces have become prominent in human-computer 
interaction, not least in the development of interactive virtual humans (Gratch et al. 2002). 
Researchers in affective computing (cf. Picard 1997) argue for increasing the expressive 
capabilities of artificial agents by modeling the influence of simulated emotions on bodily 
expressions including, e.g., facial expression, body posture and voice inflection. In doing so, 
different motives have to be contrasted (cf. Becker at al. 2007). On the one hand, there is the 
believable agent motive, which is based on the assumption that the simulation of emotions 
increases the believability and lifelikeness of an agent in social dialogues. On the other hand, 
researchers who are driven by the experimental-theoretical motive aim at a deeper under-
standing of human emotions and human emotional behavior, and they use simulated agents to 
verify their theories from a cognitive modeling perspective. There is growing consent in 
Cognitive Science that, in order to understand how the human mind works, we cannot ignore 
its affective aspects and the relationships between cognition and emotion (Hatano et al. 2000). 
 
Making a Virtual Human Emotional 
 
This contribution briefly surveys recent research at Bielefeld University on virtual humans 
with “affective minds”, this is to mean we are building agents that have an “inner life” (i.e. 
realistic emotions that modulate their behavior) and that can be seen as a testbed for the study 
of the relationship between cognition and emotion. The virtual human Max has been de-
veloped at Bielefeld University’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory to model and examine 
natural human conversational behavior in Virtual Reality face-to-face encounters. Max rests 
on a cognitive architecture that tightly integrates the faculties of perception, action, and 
cognition, running concurrently, with an emotion module (Leßmann et al. 2006). For one 
thing, perception and action are directly connected in a reactive layer; reactive behaviors 
include gaze tracking, focusing attention, and a variety of secondary behaviors (such as eye 
blink, breathing, and body sway), which can be modulated by the emotional state of the agent. 
At the same time, perceptions are also fed to a reasoning layer with a BDI (Belief-Desire-
Intention) interpreter being employed to take deliberative action.  
 
The emotion module is based on a dimensional emotion theory with pleasure, arousal, and 
dominance dimensions as described in (Becker at al. 2007) to realize the internal dynamics 
and mutual interactions of primary and secondary emotions. Primary emotions derive, in the 
reactive layer, from a form of “non-conscious” appraisal of incoming sensor information (e.g. 
fast movement in the visual field) and involve simple evaluations of positive or negative 
valence, which can directly give rise to reactive behaviors such as approach or avoidance. The 
ability to reason about the eliciting factors of one’s own emotional state is a mandatory 
prerequisite for the emergence of secondary emotions. Thus secondary emotions are derived 
from a form of “conscious” appraisal, taking place on the reasoning layer. This appraisal 
process generally includes aspects of the past and the future, making use of different kinds of 
memories also present on this layer. 
 
Max has been employed and evaluated in a number of increasingly challenging scenarios. In 
an everyday application, Max conducts multimodal smalltalk conversations with visitors to a 
public computer museum (Kopp et al. 2005). In this setting, the emotion module and its 
dynamics leads to a greater variety of often unpredictable, yet coherent emotion-colored 
responses. These responses add to the impression that the agent has a unique personality, and 
the parameters of the emotion module reflect such aspects of an agent’s personality trait. 
Furthermore, this way of modeling emotions is largely domain-independent. This has been 
shown by a successful application in a gaming scenario (Becker et al. 2005), as well as by 
simulating how the emotional state of the agent can influence cognitive processing in action 
selection and dropping unsuccessful plans (Becker et al. 2006). 
 
Outlook: Affective Theory of Mind 
 
Ongoing work pertains to enabling “mind-reading” abilities for virtual humans. Emotional 
interfaces should profit from understanding what are the other’s feelings, by inferring 
emotions of the other (affective Theory of Mind), and empathy, i.e. an affective reaction to 
the interlocutors’s emotion. A fundamental mechanism of empathy is facial mimicry, which is 
the basis for simulating another’s facial expressions to infer the same ‘feelings’ (Boukricha et 
al. 2007). An aspect further important is touch, where touch perception and its emotional 
appraisal could be used for Max to develop a form of body awareness (cf. Wachsmuth 2008). 
Thus we have started to work on simulating touch perception for the virtual agent Max, based 
on attaching a large number of virtual skin receptors to his body (Nguyen et al. 2007). This 
perceptual capability shall be utilized along with Max’s emotion system to appraise tactile 
stimuli and to determine the affective content of touch, giving rise to connect “body” and 
“mind” of a virtual human. 
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